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  We specify and implement a test for the presence and importance of labor market network based 
on residential proximity in determining the establishments at which people work.  Using matched 
employer-employee data at the establishment level, we measure the importance of these network effects 
for groups broken out by race, ethnicity, and various measures of skill.  The evidence indicates that these 
types of labor market networks do exist and play an important role in determining the establishments 
where workers work, that they are more important for minorities and the less-skilled, especially among 
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I. Introduction  
Racial and ethnic disparities in labor market outcomes in the United States are well documented.  
In addition to differences in wages and employment levels, there is evidence of workplace segregation by 
race and ethnicity (e.g., Hellerstein and Neumark, 2008).  There is also strong evidence of residential 
segregation by race and ethnicity in the United States (e.g., Iceland and Weinberg, 2002), and this 
segregation is correlated with poor labor market outcomes for minority groups, especially the low-skilled 
among them (e.g., Cutler and Glaeser, 1997). 
Theoretical models of labor market networks can formalize the link between residential 
segregation and labor market outcomes such as workplace segregation and disparities in wages and 
employment, when networks are partially or fully described by links between residential neighbors.  
Underlying all network models is some form of information imperfection where networks serve at least 
partially to mitigate these imperfections.  In the model developed by Montgomery (1991), which most 
directly motivates our analysis, the information imperfection is on the employer side.  Firms with 
vacancies cannot observe the underlying ability of a potential worker, but firms can infer something about 
a potential worker’s ability if (and only if) the firm currently employs individuals from that worker’s 
social network, where social networks are at least partially stratified by ability.
1  Hence, networks act at 
the establishment level to reduce employer search costs.  In equilibrium, individuals are more likely to 
receive and accept wage offers from firms that employ others in their social network.  In this framework, 
if social networks are at least partially race- or ethnic-based – potentially as the result of residential 
segregation – and white workers are initially employed at higher rates than other groups, then the 
existence of a larger network of white workers will lead to more job referrals at high wages for whites 
searching for jobs, creating wage disparities between whites and other groups.  Although Montgomery’s 
model does not build in a reservation wage, having an option for remaining out of the labor market would, 
in his framework, lead to employment differentials across groups as well.   
Our goal in this paper is to provide evidence on the existence and importance of labor market 
                                                 
1 See also Simon and Warner (1992) and Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007).  
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networks in determining the assignment of workers to establishments, based on a large-scale data set 
covering most of the U.S. economy.  Any study of networks has to specify the channels along which 
network connections may flow.  We study networks connecting neighbors.  Labor market network 
connections among neighbors are plausible, as neighbors may interact in a variety of ways, and existing 
evidence suggests that labor market connections among neighbors may be important (Bayer et al., 2008).  
We focus in particular on the extent to which these network connections among neighbors lead to their 
employment at the same establishment.  Our measure of this particular type of labor market network 
likely underestimates the overall importance of networks – in that networks may be based on more than 
just residence, and may help workers find employment in more than one specific establishment – and  
these types of networks may be more important for labor markets that are more local. 
We specify and implement a test for the importance of residence-based labor market networks in 
determining the establishments at which people work, using matched employer-employee data at the 
establishment level.  Our measure of labor market networks captures the extent to which employees of a 
business establishment come disproportionately from the same sets of residential neighborhoods (defined 
as census tracts), relative to the residential locations of other employees working in the same census tract 
but in different establishments.  We measure the importance of network effects for groups broken out by 
race (black and white), Hispanic ethnicity, and various measures of skill (education, English language 
proficiency, and immigrant status).  Finally, we provide evidence on the stratification of networks, asking 
whether the networks we study are race-based, operating more strongly within than across races. 
The workplace segregation of employees across establishments by residential neighborhood that 
we measure arises from residential proximity that captures the “network connectedness” important to the 
flow of labor market information between specific employers, their employees, and potential hires.  In 
particular, we first identify all establishments within each census tract in our sample.  Because we have 
matched employer-employee data, we have a sample of workers in each establishment, and we know the 
census tracts in which they live.  We compute the share of an individual’s co-workers who are his or her 
residential neighbors, relative to the share that would result if the establishment hired workers randomly  
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from the geographic areas where all individuals who work in the census tract reside.  Residence-based 
networks would predict that the share of neighbors among a worker’s co-workers would be higher – and 
possibly much higher – than would result from the random hiring process.   
While random hiring represents a reasonable lower-bound baseline for the sorting of workers by 
neighborhoods across establishments, we also consider what the upper bound would be.  In particular, if 
establishments are larger than networks, perfect sorting by residence-based networks across 
establishments cannot occur.  We therefore operationalize our measure of the importance of residential 
labor market networks by calculating what fraction of the difference between the lower bound and upper 
bounds of the extent to which a worker can work with neighbors is actually observed in the data.  Because 
we measure the fraction of the difference between the lower bound and the maximum possible sorting that 
could occur, the magnitude of our network measure can be compared across various sub-populations.  We  
also consider influences other than networks that could give rise to the observed patterns of sorting across 
establishments by residential location that we observe in the data.   
  The data we use for this study come from the 2000 Decennial Employer-Employee Database 
(DEED), which we have constructed at the U.S. Census Bureau.  The DEED is a large dataset consisting 
of workers matched to their establishment of employment.  The strength of these employer-employee 
matches is that they enable us to study directly whether workers employed in the same establishment are 
likely to live in the same neighborhoods.   
Overall, we find that residence-based labor market networks play an important role in hiring.  For 
whites, we find that the grouping of workers from the same neighborhoods in the same business 
establishments is about 10 percent of the maximum grouping that could occur.  These networks are 
largely due to the assignment of workers to specific establishments, rather than the sorting of workers in 
local labor markets by skill groups, occupations, or industries.  It is the case, though, that networks are 
more important for less-skilled whites, and in small establishments.  We find similar results for blacks, 
and some indications that residence-based labor market networks are more important for blacks than for 
whites.  Moreover, the evidence indicates that the networks we study are partly race-based, operating  
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more strongly within than across races.  We find that residence-based networks are even more significant 
for Hispanics, for whom the grouping of workers from the same neighborhoods in the same business 
establishments is about 22 percent of the maximum.  And among Hispanics, these networks play a larger 
role for immigrants and those with poor English skills.   
Like any measure that tries to operationalize the concept of job networks, ours is limited to 
measuring networks that operate among particular members, affecting employment in a specific set of 
jobs – in our case, estimating the extent to which census tract co-residents working in a specific census 
tract of employment also work in the same establishment within that tract.  To the extent that networks 
also increase the flow of information about jobs near the employers of network members (or jobs in other 
places entirely), and to the extent that networks connect people who live in different census tracts, we will 
understate the importance of labor market networks.  At the same time, the role of residence-based labor 
market networks is significant in its own right, in thinking about how spatially-based labor market 
policies might either take advantage of or, instead, inadvertently weaken or sever valuable network 
connections between neighbors.  
II. Relation to Existing Literature 
Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) review a large body of evidence that is consistent with labor 
market networks, emphasizing survey evidence of widespread reliance on friends, relatives, and 
acquaintances to search for and find jobs.  They conclude that there is little difference between blacks and 
whites in the use of informal contacts in job search, but that rates of use of informal contacts are higher 
for low-educated workers than for high-educated workers, and that there are substantially higher rates of 
use of informal contacts among Hispanics than other groups.  Subsequent work has noted the potential for 
labor market networks to be race- (or ethnic-) based so that, for example, reliance on informal referrals in 
a predominantly white labor market benefits whites at the expense of other groups (Kmec, 2007).
2   
                                                 
2 Kasinitz and Rosenberg (1996) provide case study evidence consistent with this type of network.  They study the 
Red Hook section of Brooklyn, an area of high unemployment that is populated largely by low-income blacks (and 
to some extent Hispanics), but with a large number of local jobs in the shipping industry.  They find that many 
employers hire workers almost exclusively from outside of Red Hook, recruiting employees via social networks  
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Bayer et al. (2008) move beyond survey evidence and look for evidence of network effects 
among neighbors using confidential Long-Form Census data on Boston-area workers.  They find that two 
individuals living on the same census block are one-third more likely to work on the same census block 
than are two individuals living in the same block group but not on the same block.  As long as informal 
networks are stronger within blocks than within block groups, this evidence is consistent with residence-
based labor market networks affecting hiring, the same type of network connections that we study.
3 
There are, however, some limitations of the evidence in Bayer et al.’s study, as well as in the 
broader literature, upon which we try to improve.  First, most of the existing work on networks does not 
relate employment in the same business to network connections between employees of that business.  
This is certainly true of most of the evidence based on surveys of workers.  Similarly, the data used by 
Bayer et al. contain no information on the exact establishment in which the workers work, so that two 
individuals who work on the same census block may work for different employers, particularly for blocks 
in the central city that contain multiple employers.
4  One exception is Granovetter’s seminal study (1974), 
which finds that informal contacts were often employed in the company where the job held by a 
respondent had opened up.  Our data and approach permit us to tie network connections to employment in 
a particular business establishment, and thus provide evidence more directly related to the hypothesis that 
labor market networks reduce search frictions on the part of employers, as in Montgomery’s (1991) 
model.  To the extent that networks reduce search frictions (as in the model), they enhance efficiency, 
although if networks simply act to allocate “good jobs” to some people (as in Schmutte, 2009) and not 
others they play only a distributional role.   
                                                                                                                                                             
within specific (non-black) ethnic groups. 
3 Although the baseline rate at which these workers work together is very small to begin with – 0.36 percent – this 
effect is estimated for any pair of workers; the authors suggest that the estimate implies a considerably higher 
probability that a worker works on the same block as at least one person who resides on his block. 
4 For example, focusing on central city areas in our sample of urban establishments and their employees, there are on 
average 2.58 establishments per block, which is likely an undercount by a factor of about four, given that we only 
observe in our data a subsample of establishments.  This raises questions about Bayer et al.’s assumption that 
workers employed on the same block “work with” one another or “work together” (e.g., 2008, p. 26).  Petersen et al. 
(2000) analyze data from one firm, and report that a large share of hires indicate that a referral from a friend was 
responsible for the match.  However, the data do not indicate whether the friend who made the referral was a current 
employee of the company, so there is no reason to infer that the company used referrals from current employees to 
obtain information about potential hires.    
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Second, previous work is unable to speak convincingly about differences in the importance of 
networks by race and Hispanic ethnicity, and among subgroups of Hispanics.
5  In the case of Hispanic 
workers, in particular, networks may compensate for less-developed formal hiring channels in 
predominantly immigrant communities, attributable in part, perhaps, to hiring of undocumented workers.  
(Note that if residence-based networks are important for a group, then some degree of residential 
segregation may be advantageous.)  Some of the survey evidence discussed in Ioannides and Datcher 
Loury (2004) suggests differential use of networks across racial and ethnic groups, but a good deal of the 
most-cited evidence cannot be used to address this question because it either covers narrow subsets of 
workers or a single firm.  Because of the large data set we construct, and the explicit linkage of workers to 
establishments that the data set permits, we can more fully explore the importance of networks that assign 
workers to establishments and differentials in the importance of these networks by race, by Hispanic 
ethnicity, and across subgroups of Hispanics.   
The final advantage of our approach is that it lets us assess the extent to which networks are race-
based – operating more strongly within than across races.  Theoretical work has suggested that racial 
stratification of networks may be important in perpetuating racial differences in labor market outcomes.   
Our study does share two limitations with previous work, however.  First, as in Bayer et al., 
because the data contain no direct measures of network contacts, such as information on whether an 
individual found work directly via a network connection in their neighborhood, our measure of networks 
remains an indirect one.
6  Second, as with much of the previous literature that ties networks to neighbors 
or to friends, the data contain no direct information on how or why the networks of neighbors that we 
measure are formed, or what makes some networks stronger than others.  We can provide some 
                                                 
5 Bayer et al. (2008) study data only for Boston and focus mostly on whites.   
6 In contrast, Laschever (2009) studies the employment experiences of Veterans who served together in World War 
I, who clearly shared war-time experience and most likely had subsequent interactions through various Veterans’ 
groups.  Laschever finds that there is a positive correlation between employment (and unemployment) of those who 
served together.  A similar approach is taken by Cingano and Rosolia (2009), who study the re-employment 
experiences of workers displaced from the same firm who previously worked together; they find similar evidence of 
correlated experiences.  Like much of the other evidence on networks, these studies do not have evidence regarding 
those in the network working for the same employer.  
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suggestive evidence along these lines, but our results should primarily be seen as providing descriptive 
evidence on the strength of networks at the level of residential neighborhoods. 
III. The 2000 DEED 
The analysis in this paper is based on matched employer-employee data from the 2000 DEED.  
We have constructed a similar data set for 1990 and described its construction in detail elsewhere 
(Hellerstein and Neumark, 2003).  The construction of the 2000 DEED follows the same procedures, so in 
this section we simply provide a brief overview.  Workers in the DEED are drawn from the Sample 
Edited Detail File (SEDF), which contains all individual responses to the 2000 Decennial Census of 
Population one-in-six Long Form.  The establishments are drawn from the Census Bureau’s Business 
Register list (BR) for 2000; the BR is a database containing information for all business establishments 
(with one or more employees) operating in the United States in each year, which is continuously updated 
(see Jarmin and Miranda, 2002).  The Census Bureau uses the BR as a sampling frame for its Economic 
Censuses and Surveys.  The BR contains the name and address of each establishment, geographic codes 
based on its location, its four-digit SIC code, and a unique establishment identifier. 
Households receiving the Long Form were asked to report the name and address of the employer 
in the previous week for each employed household member.  This name and address is stored in the 
“Write-In” file but not captured in the SEDF.  We use employer names and addresses in the Write-In file 
to try to match each worker to the BR.  Because the name and address information on the Write-In file is 
available for virtually all employers in the BR, nearly all of the establishments in the BR that are 
classified as “active” by the Census Bureau are available for matching.  Finally, because both the Write-In 
file and the SEDF contain identical sets of unique individual identifiers, these identifiers link the Write-In 
file to the SEDF.  Thus, this procedure yields a very large data set with workers matched to their 
establishments, along with all of the information on workers from the SEDF. 
Matching workers and establishments is difficult because employers’ names and addresses can be 
recorded differently on the two files.  We match workers and establishments based on the Write-In file 
using MatchWare – a specialized record-linkage program.  MatchWare includes a name and address  
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standardization mechanism (AutoStan), and a matching system (AutoMatch).  We first use AutoStan to 
standardize employer names and addresses across the Write-In file and the BR, to eliminate differences in 
how the same data items are reported.  The standardization software considers a wide variety of different 
ways that common address and business terms can be written, and converts each to a single standard 
form.  Once the software standardizes the business names and addresses, each item is parsed into 
components, so that we can match on various combinations of these components.  The second step is to 
select and implement the matching specifications, using AutoMatch’s probabilistic matching algorithm to 
account for missing information, misspellings, and even inaccurate information.  The AutoMatch 
software permits users to control which matching variables to use, how heavily to weight each matching 
variable, and how similar two addresses must be in order to constitute a match.  Different match 
specifications may produce different sets of matches.  Matching criteria should be broad enough to cover 
as many potential matches as possible, but narrow enough to ensure that only matches that are correct 
with a high probability are linked.  Because the AutoMatch algorithm is not exact there is always a range 
of quality of matches, and we therefore are cautious in accepting linked record pairs.  We chose matching 
algorithms based on substantial experimentation and visual inspection of many thousands of records.   
The final 2000 DEED is an extremely large data set containing information on 4.09 million 
workers matched to 1.28 million establishments, accounting for 29.1 percent of workers in the SEDF and 
22.6 percent of establishments in the BR.
7  We impose additional sample restrictions for our analysis, 
which we discuss following the explanation of our empirical methods in the next section. 
IV. Measuring the Importance of Networks 
 
We first study the importance of residence-based networks for whites, who make up the majority 
                                                 
7 For both the DEED and SEDF we have excluded individuals as follows: with missing wages; who did not work in 
the year prior to the survey year or in the reference week for the Long Form of the Census; who did not report 
positive hourly wages; who did not work in one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia (whether or not the 
place of work was imputed); who were self-employed; who were not classified in a state of residence; or who were 
employed in an industry that was considered “out-of-scope” in the BR.  (Out-of-scope industries do not fall under 
the purview of Census Bureau surveys.  They include many agricultural industries, urban transit, the U.S. Postal 
Service, private households, schools and universities, labor unions, religious and membership organizations, and 
government/public administration.  The Census Bureau does not validate the quality of BR data for businesses in 
out-of-scope industries.)  
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of our sample.  We perform a series of analyses of whites to examine alternative interpretations of the 
findings and to identify factors associated with variation in the importance of these networks.  By 
focusing first on whites we avoid confounding our results with other potential influences on the sorting of 
workers into firms by race and ethnicity, such as labor market discrimination. However, we then examine 
the importance of networks for these other groups and subsamples of them.
8  In explaining our methods 
below we refer to whites, for simplicity; the analysis is done in the same way for the other groups.   
To calculate the importance of residence-based labor market networks for the white workers in 
our sample, we first compute for each white worker in our sample the percentage of white workers with 
which that worker works who come from the same residential neighborhood as that worker.  We exclude 
the individual worker from this calculation, since it is meaningless to say that a person is his or her own 
neighbor.  This calculation requires a sample restriction to establishments where we observe at least two 
white workers.  We average this percentage across all the white workers in our sample to create a 
“network isolation index,” denoted NI
O, which measures the average fraction of a worker’s co-workers 
who are also residential neighbors of that worker.  The superscript “O” on the network isolation index 
emphasizes that this is the fraction of a white worker’s co-workers who are observed in our estimation 
sample to be residential neighbors.
9   
                                                 
8 In only one analysis – discussed later – do we combine groups.  
9 The phrase “network isolation index” borrows from the sociology literature that measures residential segregation 
(often by race) by defining the “isolation index” to be the fraction of a black person’s residential neighbors who are 
themselves black.  “Segregation” and “isolation” have the same meaning – that members of a particular group tend 
to interact with other members of the same group, rather than members of other groups.  Of course, many other 
segregation measures have been used to measure the agglomeration of individuals of similar (usually two) types 
together in society.  Measuring network segregation via the simple concept of isolation is transparent and 
compelling in our view.   
Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) measure workplace segregation in a similar manner to this paper, 
considering the fraction of an individual’s co-workers who are of a specific race, ethnicity, or skill group.  That 
paper provides a detailed discussion of the advantages of measuring segregation this way rather than via other 
indexes such as the Duncan index.  In the present study, we chose to use an isolation index rather than a Duncan 
Index for two reasons.  First, we would have had to use a multidimensional version of the Duncan index.  Such an 
index exists, but it is much less widely used in measuring segregation.  Second, Duncan indexes are invariant to 
growing populations of a given group.  For example, in measuring black-white residential segregation across census 
tracts, the Duncan index is invariant to a doubling of the black population in each census tract.  It is not clear that 
invariance is a desirable property in the context of our study.  For example, if a residential census tract becomes 
home to more poor English speaking Hispanics, it seems reasonable to allow the size of the resulting network in that 
census tract to grow and to contribute to higher network isolation.    
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  Formally, the observed network isolation index is:  
NI
O =  , 100
) j , i ( I
















where there are N workers, indexed by i and j for all possible pairs of workers.  I
R(i, j) is an indicator for 
whether workers i and j live in the same residential neighborhood, and I
W(i, j) is an indicator for whether i 
and j work in the same establishment.  The sums in the numerator and denominator are taken over all N 
workers other than the worker i.  Their ratio is the share of co-workers with whom each worker is co-
resident.  This ratio is then averaged over all workers and multiplied by 100. 
To operationalize this index, we define residential neighborhoods as census tracts.  There are a 
few reasons why this definition seems sensible.  First, census tracts define the boundaries that are 
traditionally used to measure residential segregation (see, e.g., Iceland and Weinberg, 2002).  Second (and 
related to the first), census tracts are defined by the U.S. Census Bureau to ensure that the tracts are “as 
homogeneous as possible with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living 
conditions,”
10 which in itself is a reasonable definition of a neighborhood and might make it more likely 
that co-residents interact.  Third, most census tracts are relatively small, so it is reasonable to think that it 
is quite possible that many census tract residents have contact with each other, if not “over the back 
fence,” then at parks, schools, churches, stores, business, and other institutions. 
To provide some idea of the size of census tracts, Figure 1 displays detailed maps of these tracts 
for Chicago.  For the PMSA, the median census tract was 0.57 square miles; the mean was 2.75 square 
miles.  The smallest census tract was 0.02 square miles, and the largest (in the most outlying areas of the 
PMSA) was 151 square miles.  For the city, the median was 0.17 square miles, the mean was 0.26 square 
miles, the minimum was again 0.02 square miles, and the maximum was 8 square miles.
11  
There are a number of factors that might lead to residential neighbors working in the same 
                                                 
10 See http://www.census.gov/geo/www/GARM/Ch10GARM.pdf (viewed April 21, 2008).   
11 The two large tracts within the city limits are O’Hare Field and another mainly industrial tract at the southern edge 
of the city.  
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establishment, which have nothing to do with residentially-based labor market networks.  We want to do 
everything we can to preclude these factors from influencing our measurement of labor market networks.  
First, access to mass transportation alone may lead residential neighbors to work in the same geographic 
place, although not necessarily to work in the same establishments within that place.  Therefore, in 
establishing boundaries for the local area in which workers might be employed, we again use census 
tracts.  Census tracts are generally small enough that it is possible, particularly within urban areas, for 
individuals to be able to walk from any establishment to any other establishment, so transportation 
infrastructure should not materially affect the distribution of workers across establishments in the tract.   
Second, people may have heterogeneous tastes such that those who choose to work in similar 
workplaces have similar preferences over neighborhoods.  We would expect, however, that individuals 
who have greater economic resources are better able to exercise choice about both where to live and 
where to work.  We therefore are careful to disaggregate our analyses across groups that a priori have 
differential abilities to make choices about where to live and work, and we show that those who have 
more resources, on average, are least likely to work with their neighbors. 
Third, if there is labor market discrimination against some groups of workers, those workers 
generally will be sorted into jobs with non-discriminatory employers.  Because of the potential for 
discrimination against blacks and Hispanics, in particular, we focus much of our analysis on white non-
Hispanics before examining the extent of networks for these other groups.      
Fourth, some clustering of residential neighbors into establishments would occur even if workers 
are assigned randomly to establishments, given that people tend to work relatively close to where they 
live.  Observed network isolation (NI
O) alone therefore does not give a true sense of whether residential 
networks exist, because it can be greater than zero simply owing to neighbors ending up working together 
by chance.  We therefore compute the extent of network isolation that occurs due to randomness, denoted 
NI
R.
12  In order to calculate NI
R, within a census tract we randomly assign workers to establishments, 
                                                 
12 For example, consider a census tract that has two establishments in it, each of which is observed to employ two 
black workers.  Assume that two of the black workers come from neighborhood A and two from neighborhood B.   
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ensuring that we generate the same size distribution of establishments (in terms of matched workers) 
within a census tract as we have in the sample.  Note that we generally do this using data only on 
individuals in the same racial, ethnic, or skill group for which we are trying to characterize the importance 
of networks.  We conduct this simulation 100 times, and compute the random network isolation index, 
NI
R, as the mean over these simulations.
13   
The idea behind the random allocation is as follows.  Workers, through their behavior, reveal the 
geographic areas in which they choose to work (aside from the clustering at specific establishments).  
These decisions may be based on proximity, public transportation, highway exits, industry, etc.  Having 
made these choices, some workers from the same neighborhood will end up at the same establishment 
even if there are no network connections between them. Our randomization is meant to capture this 
component of the clustering and to subtract it out from observed clustering, yielding a remainder that 
arises from the systematic processes that determine the establishments at which people work. 
The difference NI
O − NI
R measures network isolation above and beyond that which occurs 
randomly, which we refer to as the “network isolation difference.”  This difference captures the excess 
presence of co-residents in a worker’s own establishment relative to the presence of co-residents in the 
same work location.  This computation requires a second sample restriction – that census tracts of 
employment include at least two establishments with two black workers.  Otherwise, if the only black 
workers in a census tract work together in one establishment, we cannot distinguish the effect of 
residence-based labor market networks from random clustering.  
While NI
R provides a measure of the lower bound of the extent to which workers work with 
neighbors,
14 it is also important to know what the upper bound of network isolation could be in our data 
given the distribution of individuals across residential census tracts and the size distribution of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Even if the four black workers are randomly allocated across the two establishments without regard to the 
neighborhoods in which they live, 1/3 of the time they will be working with a neighbor, so that NI
R will be 1/3.     
13 Not surprisingly, in our very large sample the random network isolation measures are very precise; in all cases the 
standard deviations were trivially small.     
14 This is not the true lower bound, of course.  A social planner could force the network isolation index to go below 
NI
R by deliberately disbursing neighbors across establishments to minimize neighbor-to-neighbor contact in the 
workplace, but this counterfactual is one that seems unlikely to be generated in practice.   
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establishments in each census tract.  Because establishments within a particular census tract of 
employment often contain more workers in them than there are workers from any particular census tract 
of residence represented among those establishments, the upper bound of network isolation is unlikely to 
ever reach 100 percent (full segregation, such that workers work only with their neighbors).  
There may be individual instances of workplace census tracts in our data where we could 
compute the exact maximum network isolation index, but there is no known general method for solving 
for the maximum index in all cases in our data.  We instead approximate the maximum network isolation 
through a “greedy” algorithm.  For a given census tract in which we have establishments represented in 
our sample, we order the neighborhoods in which workers live by the number of workers from each 
neighborhood.  Beginning with the neighborhood with the greatest number of workers, we assign as many 
workers as possible to one establishment, and any workers who are not assigned to that establishment are 
grouped together and treated as a “new” neighborhood.  We then move to the second largest 
neighborhood from which workers originate (which could be the “new” neighborhood left from the 
previous pass), and assign workers from that neighborhood to the establishment that holds the maximum 
number of these, again therefore keeping neighbors working together in establishments as much as 
possible.  We continue moving down the list of neighborhoods, from those with larger to smaller numbers 
of workers, assigning workers to establishments until all workers are assigned.
15  We would expect this 
maximum network isolation index to be less than 100 percent.
16,17  We do this for every census tract in 
                                                 
15 This algorithm assigns workers to establishments in a way that simulates the maximum possible neighborhood 
isolation, by mechanically ensuring that it is more likely that workers from large neighborhoods will work together.  
After assigning workers from the large neighborhoods, it often is still likely that we can assign workers from small 
neighborhoods to work together in establishments, filling in the remaining slots in establishments that are not filled 
by the workers from large neighborhoods.  In contrast, if we instead started with smaller neighborhoods, we would 
be more likely to end up having to distribute workers from a large neighborhood across many establishments.   
16 For example, consider a census tract that employs nine workers across three establishments, A, B, and C.  
Establishment A employs five workers, while establishments B and C each employ two workers.  Six of the workers 
live in one census tract 1, two live in tract 2, and one lives in tract 3.  We first take the workers from the largest 
neighborhood, tract 1, and put five of them in establishment A, forming a new “neighborhood” (call it tract 1A) 
consisting of the one leftover worker from tract 1.  We then take the two workers from tract 2, the next largest 
neighborhood, and put them in establishment B (the same result occurs if we put them in establishment C).  This 
leaves a single worker from tract 3 and the single leftover worker from tract 1A, who have to be assigned in this 
example to establishment C so as to preserve the size distribution of establishments, yielding a maximum network 
isolation index of {(5/9)·1 + (2/9)·1 + (2/9)·0} = 7/9.    
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our sample where workers work, and then compute the weighted average of the maximum network 
isolation in each census tract of employment, weighting by the number of workers we observe to be 
working in that census tract.  We label this maximum network isolation index NI
M.  The difference (NI
M 
− NI
R) then provides a measure of the maximum extent to which networks could lead to workplace 
sorting above and beyond sorting that would occur randomly.   
Finally, we turn back to (NI
O − NI
R), the difference between our observed network isolation index 
and the random isolation index, and we scale it by (NI
M− NI






which we call the “effective network isolation index.”  It measures what share of the maximum possible 
network isolation that could occur in the data actually does occur in the data.
18  As such, it provides a 
natural scaling for the importance of networks formed by residential networks in determining the 
establishments in which people are employed, and because it is a scaled measure it can be compared 
across different samples with different possible lower and upper bounds of network isolation.  For these 
reasons, the effective network isolation index is our preferred measure of network isolation.  Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 Computing the maximum network isolation that could occur for an arbitrary group of workers, residential census 
tracts, and workplaces falls into a well-known class of problems in computer science called “n-p complete” 
problems.  For more on n-p completeness and greedy algorithms, see, for example, Cormen et al. (2001).  The 
greedy algorithm we use is bounded from above by the true maximum, but the extent to which it is an 
understatement is unknown.  However, there is an argument, in this context, for not being overly concerned about 
this program.  In particular, although the theoretical maximum network isolation index is the one that would arise if 
a social planner had full control of the assignment of workers to establishments (and could solve the n-p complete 
problem of computing the maximum isolation index), the greedy algorithm we employ is one that would actually 
bound from above what might happen in the real world if employers each individually tried to hire to the maximum 
extent possible from only a small set of neighborhoods – and where large employers might have more resources and 
therefore more ability to do so.  In that sense our algorithm for computing maximum network isolation may actually 
be a very reasonable practical measure to use. 
18 Our analysis has some parallels to Oyer and Schaefer’s (2009) study of the concentration of lawyers from 
particular schools in different law firms, which may be due to networks.  Like us, they consider deviations of the 
observed concentration of students from particular law schools relative to what would occur randomly, although 
measured using the Ellison-Glaeser (1997) index of concentration.  They do this for exactly the same reason: “under 
random selection of attorneys by firms, we would still observe some concentration in realized law-school shares” (p. 
9).  There are some differences in our analysis, however.  First, we randomly assign workers to establishments 
within the Census tract in which they work, rather than nationally; that is we do the randomization repeatedly for a 
very large number of Census tracts.  Second, when we do the randomization we preserve the size distribution of 
establishments, because otherwise changes in this size distribution could themselves affect the network isolation 
measures; we are not aware of how this would translate into the Ellison-Glaeser framework.  And third, because of 
the nature of what we are trying to measure, there is a maximum amount of network isolation that could occur, of 
which (as just described) we take account by the rescaling in the above equation.   
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Bootstrap methods are used to assess the statistical significance of our estimates of the 
importance of residence-based networks themselves, of differences across different demographic groups, 
and of different analyses (with and without conditioning), etc.
19  We always find that the effective 
network isolation measures we report are strongly statistically significantly different from zero, and are 
estimated very precisely.  The tables report the statistical significance of the important comparisons 
across estimates; because the estimates of the effective network indices are quite precise, almost all 
differences across columns and tables in the estimated effective network isolation measures are also 
statistically significant.   
V. Sample Characteristics and Restrictions 
  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the matched workers from the SEDF (column (1)) and 
from each of our DEED analysis samples (columns (2)-(5)).  We make several restrictions to arrive at the 
samples used for our analysis.  First, we only consider workers who live and work in the same 
Metropolitan Statistical Area/Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA/PMSA).  Second, in order to 
be able to identify a race- or ethnic-based workplace network, we exclude from the sample workers with 
no co-workers in the same establishment who are of the same race or ethnicity.  Finally, we retain only 
workers in establishments that are located in census tracts with at least one other establishment having 
two matched workers of the same race or ethnic group, so that we can meaningfully consider the 
distribution of workers across establishments in a census tract.   
The individuals we successfully match in the DEED are more likely to be female, to work full 
time, and to have more education than those in the SEDF.  These differences result in part from the 
matching process, because there are many individuals who meet our sample inclusion criteria but for 
whom the quality of the business address information in the Write-In file is poor.  The differences in 
business address information likely reflect weaker labor market attachment among less-skilled workers, 
                                                 
19 Confidence intervals are constructed from bootstrap replications in which we bootstrap the entire sample, and then 
compute each of the measures in the tables that follow.  Thus, we obtain bootstrap replications of the differences 
between any pair of effective isolation measures within or across tables.    
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suggesting that estimates of the importance of networks we obtain might best be interpreted as measuring 
the extent of network isolation among workers who have relatively high attachment to the labor force and 
to their employers.  As shown in the last eight rows of the table, there is some over-representation of 
workers in manufacturing in the full DEED, because larger establishments are more likely to be matched, 
although the over-representation is not severe. 
To examine the characteristics of establishments in the DEED once we make our sample 
restrictions, Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for establishments in the full DEED and for each of our 
final analysis samples.  Because only one in six workers is sent the Decennial Census Long Form, it is 
more likely that large establishments will have two matched workers, especially for smaller racial or 
ethnic groups; this is reflected in the medians for total employment in the establishment as recorded in the 
BR, and how these medians increase for the different subsamples we analyze.
20  Later in the empirical 
analysis we consider the possible ramifications for the estimates of these consequences of our sample 
selection rules.   
VI. Network Isolation Results  
VI.1. Results for Whites 
Table 3 presents results for the approximately 1.7 million white workers in our sample, who work 
in 26,470 unique census tracts and live in 46,764 census tracts.
21  The mean number of establishments in 
each census tract for which we observe at least two white workers in two establishments is 130; the mean 
number of residents from the same neighborhood working in the same census tract is 9.4.   
The observed network isolation index (NI
O) for the full sample of whites, reported in column (1), 
is 7.87, indicating that, on average, a white worker works in an establishment where 7.87 percent of 
his/her white co-workers live in the same census tract as that worker.  When we randomize workers in 
this sample across establishments within census tracts, the random network isolation index (NI
R) is 2.97, 
                                                 
20 This bias presumably also influences the distribution of workers and establishments across industries, where, for 
example, the DEED itself, and the final analysis samples for blacks and Hispanics even more so, over-represent 
workers in manufacturing establishments.   
21 This is out of a total of about 65,000 census tracts in 2000.    
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and the network isolation difference (the difference between the two) is 4.90.  Our calculated maximum 
possible network isolation index (NI
M) indicates that white workers in our data could work in 
establishments in which at most 52.06 percent of their co-workers are neighbors.  This is well below an 
average of 100 (perfect sorting of workers by residential neighborhoods into establishments), because in 
many of our census tracts there are establishments with more workers than are drawn from any particular 
census tract residential neighborhood.  When we rescale the network isolation difference by the maximum 
network isolation that occurs beyond randomness, we recover an effective network isolation index of 
9.99.  That is, about 10 percent of the maximum amount to which residential networks (at the census tract 
level) could contribute to the sorting of workers into establishments is actually reflected in the sorting of 
workers into establishments.  Whether this is a large number or a small one is a subjective matter, and 
there is little with which to compare it given the sparseness of empirical evidence on the importance of 
labor market networks.  To us, however, it seems like a large number suggesting that residential labor 
market networks are quite important.  
This evidence could reflect sorting of workers by both neighborhoods and establishments 
according to skill, rather than residential networks.  For example, one establishment in a census tract may 
hire only less-skilled workers who tend to live together in a neighborhood where housing is cheap, while 
a second establishment hires only more-skilled workers who tend to live together in a different 
neighborhood with more expensive housing.
22  To evaluate this alternative, columns (2)-(4) report 
network isolation results conditional on various proxies for skill, based on conditional network isolation 
indexes that simulate network isolation while holding fixed the skill distribution of workers within 
establishments.    
To construct these conditional indexes, we modify the procedure used previously to construct the 
random network isolation index (NI
R).  Instead of randomly assigning all workers in a census tract of 
employment to any job in any establishment in the tract, holding the size distribution of establishments 
                                                 
22 In Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) we report evidence of some segregation of workers across establishments 
based on skill levels.  Bayer et al. (2005) provide evidence of residential segregation by education for blacks.    
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fixed, we instead ensure that workers are assigned (randomly) only to jobs that are observed in the real 
data to be held by a worker with the same level of skill.  We then once again compute the average (across 
the simulations) simulated fraction of co-workers who come from a worker’s own neighborhood, 
denoting this NI





R}]·100  ,      
where NI
R and NI
M are defined as before (i.e., without regard to skill level).  When NI
O = NI
C, the 
conditional effective network isolation index is zero, implying that all of the observed network isolation is 
actually attributable to the sorting of workers by residential census tract into establishments on the basis 
of skill alone; that is, above and beyond the clustering of employment of neighbors in the same skill 
group, there is no clustering in the same establishment.  Conversely, when NI
C = NI
R, the conditional and 
unconditional network isolation indexes are equal, implying that all of the effective network isolation 
comes from networks helping individuals find jobs in specific establishments, and that skill (as we 
measure it) plays no role in sorting. 
In column (2) we construct the index conditional on two education categories: high school degree 
or less, and more than high school.  The simulated conditional network isolation index (NI
C) that results is 
3.02, only a little higher than the random (unconditional) network isolation index in column (1) of 2.97.  
As a result, the conditional network isolation difference (NI
O − NI
C) is 4.84, and the conditional effective 
network isolation index is 9.86, very similar to the unconditional index of 9.99.  Thus, even conditional 
on the assignment of workers to establishments on the basis of whether or not they have attended college 
at all, 9.86 percent of the maximum amount of clustering of workers into establishments on the basis of 
census tract of residence is observed in the data.  In column (3) we refine the education groups to 
condition on four different levels of educational attainment: less than high school, high school degree, 
some college, and bachelor’s degree or more.  Here the simulated conditional isolation index is slightly 
bigger, at 3.13, but the conditional effective network isolation index is still 9.65, so that overall, 
conditioning on education only reduces the effective isolation index by less than 4 percent.   
In columns (4) and (5) we use two different proxies for skill.  In column (4), we condition on six  
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occupation categories.  The results again do not suggest much of a role for skill sorting in explaining 
effective network isolation: the simulated conditional network isolation index is 3.25, so that the network 
isolation difference is 4.61, and the resulting effective network isolation index 9.40.  In column (5), we 
use a measure of house prices as a proxy for skill, given that skill can manifest in this dimension of the 
accumulation of wealth.
23  The results of this exercise suggest a slightly larger role for this measure of 
skill in explaining network isolation, but again the results are similar; the simulated conditional network 
isolation index is 3.49, and the resulting effective network isolation index is 8.92. 
Across columns (2)-(5), then, we find that sorting of workers across census tracts by a variety of 
proxies for skill explains very little (at most 11 percent) of the overall (unconditional) effective network 
isolation.
24  Because our measures of skill are only proxies and are not all-inclusive, this evidence is by 
nature not definitive.  Nonetheless, given that the results are robust across three different dimensions of 
skill (education, occupation, and housing values), we view the results as providing strong evidence that 
skill does not play a major role in driving our measure of network isolation.
25 
We can also examine whether network isolation varies across skill groups, which we do in the 
last two columns of Table 3.  Column (6) reports results for whites with at most a high school education, 
computed for the sample of white workers who have no more than a high school education.  The observed 
network isolation index, averaging across the sample of low-educated white workers the fraction of each 
                                                 
23 We calculate the average house price for each census tract in our sample as reported by responding homeowners 
in the SEDF.  Then, within each MSA, we calculate the quartiles of average house prices across census tracts, and 
assign to each worker in our sample an indicator for the quartile of the within-MSA house price distribution in 
which that worker’s census tract of residence falls.  We then a construct simulated network isolation index by 
randomizing workers to a job within their census tract of employment held by someone whose residential census 
tract falls within the same quartile of the house price distribution.   
24 The Bayer et al. (2008) study addresses the issue of sorting on skill in a different manner.  They argue that the 
sorting of individuals on residential location is at the block group level (roughly speaking, 10-block areas), so that a 
finding that those living on the same individual block are more likely to work on the same block (albeit a different 
one) than are those living on the same block group reflects geographic proximity but not sorting.  Evidence they 
present based on observables suggests that, in their analysis, this assumption is likely to be valid.    
25 It is possible that our results are driven not by networks, but by family connections, where family members, 
especially spouses, might work together and live together in the same household.  In unreported results, we restrict 
the sample to white males only, so that spouses are excluded.  The effective network isolation index declines by 
about one-third (from 9.99 to 6.44) when we do this.  However, this sample selection rule also has other substantial 
effects on the sample (reducing mean establishments per tract and mean matched workers per establishment by 
about 40 percent, as well as, of course, dropping females), so the results are not strictly comparable.    
20 
 
individual’s white low-educated co-workers who live in that individual’s residential census tract, is 10.95, 
somewhat higher than the 7.87 number for the full sample of whites as reported in column (1).  We 
calculate the simulated network isolation index by randomly assigning workers to jobs held by low-
educated white workers in establishments in their census tract of work, and then, for low-educated white 
workers, calculating the fraction of simulated co-workers who live in the same residential census tract.  
The random network isolation index is 4.81, with the net effect that the network isolation difference of 
6.15 is also higher than for the full sample.  Finally, the calculated maximum possible network isolation 
index for this low-education subsample is 52.01, very similar to that of column (1).  Thus, the effective 
network isolation index is 13.02, 30 percent higher than the corresponding figure in column (1).   
Column (7) reports results from the same exercise for whites with more than a high school 
degree.  The resulting measures of network isolation are smaller than in the full sample; the network 
isolation difference for this group is 3.66, and the effective network isolation index is 8.82.  Comparing 
columns (1), (6), and (7), the results suggest that residence-based networks are more important for low-
educated whites, as has been suggested in previous surveys of workers’ use of informal contacts by 
education.  This difference by skill may arise because residence-based networks are more important for 
local labor markets, which are more significant for low-skilled than for high-skilled workers.  The 
evidence of residence-based networks for both schooling groups also suggests, like the evidence in 
columns (2) through (5), that the full-sample results in column (1) are not being spuriously driven by the 
joint sorting of workers by education level into neighborhoods and establishments.   
Another potential alternative explanation of our results is that rather than residential 
neighborhood influencing where one works – via residence-based networks – place of work determines 
where one lives.  If, for example, co-workers recommend neighborhoods or houses to which workers then 
move, then we would see clustering of neighbors in the same establishments, but this would not be due to 
the operation of residence-based networks.  This alternative explanation of our findings does not seem  
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plausible, on a priori grounds, as job mobility is much higher than residential mobility.
26  We could 
answer this question definitively if we knew where workers lived when they first began working (or 
applied for work) at a particular employer, but of course we do not have such data.  However, in the 
Census data we know whether a person has changed addresses in the past five years, and in the Business 
Register we know establishment age.  Thus, if we restrict attention to residents who have not moved in 
the past five years who work in establishments that are fewer than five years old, then we know that our 
measure of the importance of networks has to be based on a predetermined choice of residential location, 
since that decision necessarily preceded the decision to work at a new establishment.
27   
This analysis is reported in Table 4.  Column (1) shows the baseline estimates from Table 3.  In 
column (2), we make the additional restriction that all workers in the sample work in establishments that 
are less than five years old (as of the 2000 Census).  The effective network isolation index is quite a bit 
higher – 15.21 versus 9.99.  This may be because newer establishments are smaller; we show later that the 
index is higher for small establishments.  Finally, column (3) restricts attention to those individuals who 
did not change residential addresses in the past five years, and the effective index climbs substantially, to 
22.87.  Thus, when we focus on those for whom the residential location decision is exogenous to the 
workplace location decision, we find stronger evidence of residence-based networks.
28  This evidence 
actually strengthens the interpretation of the results as reflecting residence-based networks, because we 
would expect such network connections to be stronger among those who have lived in their 
neighborhoods for longer amounts of time, and who therefore are more likely to have connections to 
neighbors through any of a number of channels.  
To this point we have presumed that residence-based networks help workers find jobs in 
                                                 
26 For example, based on March CPS data for 1999-2000, the rate of within-county residential mobility – which 
might roughly correspond to the type of move that would put one near a co-worker – was 9 percent on an annual 
rate.  (See http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/p20-538/tab01.txt (viewed July 8, 2009).)  But the 
monthly job-to-job mobility rate is in the range of 2.7-3.2 percent (Moscarini and Thomsson, 2008); if this is 
independent across months, it implies an annual job mobility rate of around 30 percent.   
27 Bayer et al. (2008) do a related analysis, for the same reason. 
28 Establishments in column (3) are larger, on average, than those in column (2), because imposing the requirement 
that there be two matched workers per establishment with a more stringent criterion on workers to begin with (in this 
case, non-movers) makes small establishments less likely to be included in the sample.    
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particular establishments.  However, networks may instead (or as well) help job searchers find jobs in 
certain industries.  For example, a worker in a retail firm may tell a neighbor of job vacancies in nearby 
retail businesses.  If networks increase the likelihood that neighbors work in the same industry, our 
calculations might overstate the extent to which networks determine the establishment of employment, 
because the clustering of neighbors in the same industry within a census tract of employment will 
inevitably lead to some clustering in the same establishments.
29  Of course if residence-based networks 
largely operate at the industry rather than establishment level, they would still be important.   
To explore whether the network effects we find reflect employment at the establishment level, or 
instead only at the industry level, we construct conditional network isolation indexes where we simulate 
network isolation while holding the distribution of workers across industries fixed within a census tract of 
employment.  Intuitively, if a particular residential census tract has a lot of workers employed in a 
specific industry, then the random allocation of workers in the simulation will preserve that industry 
concentration, and by subtracting off the network isolation that occurs randomly conditional on industry it 
will isolate the extent to which the clustering of census tract co-residents in the same establishments 
exceeds the clustering that is driven by them working in the same industry.  
  Table 5 reports results conditioning on eight industry categories, and then results conditioning on 
two education categories as well, to allow for the possibility that industry-specific networks operate more 
within than across skill groups.  The simulated index conditioning on industry is 4.02 (column (2)), so 
that when workers are randomly assigned to establishments in the same industry (and census tract) in 
which they are observed to work, on average 4.02 percent of their co-workers come from the same 
residential neighborhood.  This is higher than the unconditional random isolation index of 2.97, so that 
the conditional effective network isolation index of 7.83 is smaller than the unconditional effective index 
of 9.99 reported in column (1).  The difference implies that assignment of workers from the same 
neighborhoods to specific industries within a census tract can explain some of the assignment of workers 
                                                 
29 That is, two workers employed in the same census tract who work in the same industry are more likely to work in 
the same establishment than are two randomly chosen workers employed in the same census tract.   
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to specific establishments.  However, 78.5 percent of the effective network isolation remains even after 
we condition on a worker’s industry.
30  Thus, at this level of industry detail, most of the (unconditional) 
effective network isolation for whites cannot be explained just by a mechanism whereby residence-based 
networks serve only to help workers find jobs in the same industries as their neighbors.  In column (3) we 
condition on two education categories (high school degree or less vs. some college or more) as well as 
industry.  The simulated conditional network isolation index is again higher, at 4.12, so that the 
conditional effective index is 7.63.  While this conditional effective network isolation index is slightly 
lower than the results conditional on industry only, 76.5 percent of the unconditional effective index 
remains after this conditioning. 
  We noted earlier that constructing the DEED and imposing our sample restrictions leads our 
analysis samples to consist disproportionately of large establishments.  If networks are more important in 
small establishments than in large establishments, this will bias our network isolation index downward.  
There are two reasons to think this could be the case.  First, networks might operate primarily among 
individuals who work in the same occupation, and if large establishments have more occupational 
heterogeneity, our measure of network strength may understate the importance of networks in large 
establishments because it treats all workers in establishments as equally eligible to be in networks 
together.
31  Second, other evidence (e.g., Holzer, 1998) suggests that small establishments rely more on 
informal referrals in hiring, and if this is associated with the kinds of networks we measure, then network 
isolation should vary across establishment size.  Therefore, in Table 6 we disaggregate the results by 
splitting the sample of establishments into four size categories.   
Column (2) reports the results for establishments with reported employment from the Business 
                                                 
30 This is likely a lower bound for the percentage of the effective network isolation index that remains.  If there are 
only a few establishments in an industry in a particular census tract, then what this procedure treats as sorting on 
industry may represent sorting on establishments.  In the limit, with only one establishment in the industry in the 
census tract we could not distinguish between sorting on industry or establishment, whereas the conditioning 
procedure used in this subsection attributes the sorting to industry first, and only the residual to establishment.  
31 However, given that conditioning on occupation in the overall sample of white workers had little influence on the 
effective network isolation index (Table 3), we doubt that stratification of networks by occupation within 
establishments plays a major role.    
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Register of 50 employees or fewer.  The observed network isolation index, NI
O, is 15.76, much larger 
than 7.87 for the full sample.  The simulated random network isolation difference is also somewhat bigger 
than for the full sample (4.55 versus 2.97), but the implied network isolation difference is still much 
larger for the small establishments.  Because the maximum possible indexes are similar for the full 
sample and for the sample of small establishments, the resulting network isolation index for small 
establishments is 22.87, more than twice as large as for the full sample (9.99).  Moving across the 
columns, where establishment size categories rise from 51-100 employees in column (3), to 101-250 in 
column (4), and to greater than 250 employees in column (5), the effective network isolation index 
decreases monotonically across the columns, although the biggest drop comes when moving from the 
smallest establishments to those with at least 51 employees.  In total, the results quite consistently 
indicate that networks are more important in small establishments.  
VI.2. Results for Blacks, and Black-White Differences   
The importance of networks may differ for blacks and whites.  On the one hand, as 
Montgomery’s (1991) model suggests, because whites make up a greater fraction of the working 
population, if networks are race-based one might expect white individuals searching for employment to 
be able to take advantage of a larger network of white working neighbors, making it more likely that 
whites will work together in the same establishment than will blacks, above and beyond what would be 
predicted by random allocation.
32  On the other hand, if labor market networks serve to overcome 
information imperfections more for blacks than for whites, perhaps by helping to lower search costs for 
blacks related to finding non-discriminatory employers, or overcoming stigma, one might expect network 
isolation to be larger for blacks than for whites.   
In Table 7 we report results for black workers, restricting the sample over which we compute 
network isolation to census tracts of employment where we observe at least two blacks working in at least 
two establishments.  We restrict the sample only to black workers because if we include both blacks and 
                                                 
32 In our full samples of whites and blacks in columns (1) of Tables 3 and 7 (discussed below), blacks have an 
average of 10 black working neighbors, whereas whites have an average of 64 white working neighbors.  
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whites and there is discrimination in the labor market, we would expect to observe sorting of workers by 
race across establishments.  Then, because there is residential segregation by race, we would spuriously 
generate a finding of network isolation.  In contrast, by considering only blacks we ask whether there is 
segregation of blacks by neighborhood of residence across workplaces above and beyond the segregation 
of workers across establishments as a function of race alone (or something correlated with race alone).   
Column (1) reports results for the full sample of black workers.  The observed network isolation 
index (NI
O) for all blacks is 5.29, meaning that on average, of a black worker’s black co-workers, 5.29 
percent come from that worker’s neighborhood.  This is somewhat smaller than for whites, and the 
random network isolation index (NI
R) is 2.58, just slightly below that for whites; the network isolation 
difference is therefore 2.71.  However, for blacks the maximum possible network isolation index (NI
M) is 
30.71, quite a bit below that for whites, with the net result that the effective network isolation index of 
9.63 is very close to what we find for whites (although statistically different from it).  These results, 
which underscore the importance of scaling the network isolation difference by the extent to which 
network isolation is possible in the data, suggest little racial difference in our full samples of blacks and 
whites in the importance of residence-based networks in explaining the assignment of workers to 
establishments, once we rescale the network isolation difference by the maximum.
33          
In column (2) we report results for blacks who have at most a high school education, and in 
column (3) for blacks who have more than a high school education.  The results by education address the 
issue of sorting by skill, and examine whether black-white differences reflect race differences in 
education coupled with variation across skill groups in the importance of residence-based labor market 
networks.  In both cases, the observed and simulated indexes are lower for blacks than for whites, as are 
the network isolation differences.  When we scale the results by the maximum possible network isolation 
differences, the results reverse somewhat for low-educated blacks, so that the effective network isolation 
                                                 
33 We find only a few instances where comparisons of the network isolation difference, NI
O − NI
R, and the effective 




R)]·100, lead to qualitatively different conclusions.  The results for 
blacks and whites discussed in this paragraph are one such instance.  Indeed, it is only for the black-white 
comparisons that the conclusions are ever sensitive to scaling by the maximum possible segregation   
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index for low-educated blacks is somewhat larger than for whites (and statistically different as well) – 
15.02 versus 13.02 – whereas for more-educated blacks, the effective index is somewhat smaller than for 
whites – 7.30 versus 8.82.  Whether or not we scale by the maximum, though, the evidence suggests that 
residentially-based networks are more important for less-educated blacks than for more-educated blacks.   
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 7 are in line with other results from the literature, based on 
quite different types of analyses, including: survey results or indirect evidence indicating greater use of 
informal contacts among the less-educated (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004; Topa, 2001); evidence 
based on place of work and place of residence indicating stronger network effects among those with less 
education (Bayer et al., 2008);
 34 and an absence of consistent evidence of race differences in the reported 
use of informal contacts (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004).   
Table 8 presents additional analyses for black and white workers.  One issue with directly 
comparing the full sample results for blacks and whites is that we know these groups are not similarly 
distributed geographically in the United States.  As a result, black and white workers in our sample may 
work in different labor markets where the importance of networks could differ as a result of labor market 
institutions, constraints, or other factors.  Therefore, in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 we present 
estimates for whites and blacks restricting the samples to workers working in census tracts that are 
represented by workers in both the white and black samples.
35  For whites, the sample restriction reduces 
the sample by about one-half, and the numbers of workplace census tracts and residential census tracts are 
also reduced considerably.  The results are somewhat different than for the full sample of whites.  First, 
the observed network isolation index falls to 5.68, and is closer to that for blacks.  Second, the effective 
network isolation measure is lower (7.38 vs. 9.99 in column (1)).
36  Column (4) reports results for blacks.  
                                                 
34 Weinberg et al. (2004) study neighborhood effects on hours worked, as a manifestation of network effects, and 
also find stronger effects for the less-educated.   
35 That is, we restrict the samples of whites and blacks to those who work in census tracts in which we observe at 
least two establishments employing at least two white workers each, and two establishments employing at least two 
black workers each (where these latter two or more establishments could overlap with those for which we observe 
white employment as well).   
36 The same is true of the network isolation difference.  Note that the difference between the effective network 
isolation measure in columns (1) and (3) is driven in part by the higher maximum isolation measure in the latter  
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The effective network isolation index for the restricted sample of blacks is 9.41, quite similar to the figure 
of 9.63 in column (2), which is not surprising since between columns (2) and (4) the sample is reduced by 
fewer than 4,000 workers.  The random network isolation measure is quite a bit lower for this sample of 
whites than for blacks (1.48 vs. 2.54), so that the network isolation difference is higher for whites than for 
blacks (4.20 vs. 2.72).  However, the maximum network isolation index for whites is almost double that 
for blacks, so that when we scale by our measure of maximum possible isolation, we reverse the relative 
magnitudes of isolation for blacks and whites.  Thus, there is suggestive evidence that networks are more 
important for blacks than whites in comparable areas. 
VI.3. Racial Stratification of Networks  
The results we have presented thus far suggest that residence-based networks are important, and 
in that sense point to racially-stratified networks.  After all, given that there is pervasive racial residential 
segregation in the United States (Iceland and Weinberg, 2002), networks that are predicated on residential 
“connectedness” have to be partially race-based.  However, it is important also to consider whether there 
is racial stratification of networks even within neighborhoods – that is, the idea that labor market 
information and especially job referrals are less likely to flow between black and white co-residents than 
between co-residents of the same race.
37      
Therefore, in column (5) of Table 8 we assess more directly whether networks are race-based.  
We carry out the same types of sampling and computational procedures used before, except that we 
consider the relevant set of a black worker’s neighbors and co-workers to consist of blacks or whites.  We 
begin by constructing a sample of black workers and their neighbors, regardless of race, who we observe 
to work in establishments where at least one other black or white worker is matched.  We then further 
restrict the sample to those who work in a census tract with at least two establishments that have workers 
                                                                                                                                                             
case.  This occurs because the observations in column (3) come from a much smaller number of tracts with many 
more establishments, making it possible to achieve a higher maximum amount of network isolation. 
37 Racial stratification of networks within neighborhoods can potentially explain the results in Hellerstein et al. 
(2008) that higher local job density for one’s own race affects employment probabilities, but higher job density for 
the other race does not.  In that paper, however, the network effects do not necessarily operate among those living in 
the same neighborhood, as we estimated the effect of the density of jobs in a residential neighborhood – whether or 
not held by neighbors – on residents’ employment.    
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in the sample.  We again construct an effective network isolation index for black workers in this sample, 
but we now construct this measure by asking whether our sample of black workers are more likely than 
would be predicted by randomness to work in the same establishment with a neighbor, regardless of the 
race of that neighbor.  If networks among co-residents are racially stratified, then the network isolation 
that results when we measure how likely it is that a black works with a neighbor regardless of race should 
be smaller than when we measure how likely it is that a black works with a black neighbor.
38      
For each black worker in our sample, we first calculate an observed network isolation index by 
averaging across the sample (of black workers) the fraction of each individual’s co-workers who live in 
that individual’s residential census tract, regardless of race.  As shown in the last column of Table 8, this 
number is 3.99, substantially lower than the 5.29 number in column (2).  We then calculate the random 
network isolation index by taking all workers in this sample, randomizing them (as before) across 
establishments in that sample, and calculating the network isolation index for the black workers in this 
simulated sample.  The random network isolation index is 2.00, leading to a network isolation difference 
of 2.00.  The fact that this difference is lower than when we restrict the sample of co-workers to blacks, in 
column (2), suggests that race is indeed playing a role in driving the probability of working with a 
neighbor.  We obtain a measure of the maximum possible network isolation index by approximating what 
the index would be for blacks if the workers who make up this sample were able to work to the maximum 
extent possible in establishments with their neighbors of any race, given the size distribution of 
establishments in our sample, the residential distribution of workers in them, and the workers’ races.   
The resulting maximum network isolation number is 35.83, which is somewhat larger than that in 
column (2).  Taking all of these together, the effective network isolation index as reported in column (5) 
is only 5.90, which is about 40 percent smaller than in column (2), providing evidence that residence-
                                                 
38 That said, this differential network effect does not rule out the possibility that whites and blacks within a 
neighborhood share information on job openings equally, but that this information is more productive for blacks in 
matching blacks to establishments when the information serves to link a black neighbor to a job in an establishment 
held by another black neighbor.  In other words, we cannot distinguish whether network connections between black 
and white neighbors are fewer in number or less productive; all we can do is characterize the relative importance of 
these network connections.    
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based labor market networks have a fairly strong race-based component.  Moreover, because in this 
column we only need one black worker in an establishment for the establishment to be in the sample, as 
opposed to column (2), which requires two black workers, column (5) includes smaller establishments for 
which, as already noted, residence-based networks are more important.  Thus, on a comparable basis the 
difference between the effective network isolation indexes in columns (2) and (5) would be even larger, 
bolstering the evidence that these networks are racially stratified.   
VI.4. Results for Hispanics 
Survey evidence suggests that Hispanics use referrals in finding employment much more than do 
blacks or whites (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004).  Immigrants and poor English speakers in 
particular may suffer from high search costs in the labor market, both because their limited understanding 
of U.S. labor markets and of English may make it hard for them to search widely in the labor market, and 
because potential employers may have a difficult time inferring the ability of these workers.  Finding 
employment through informal networks of other immigrants and those who speak one’s native language 
may therefore be particularly important for these groups.  There is some indirect evidence consistent with 
this conjecture.  For example, evidence of “enclave effects,” such as Hispanics with poor English skills 
paying less of a penalty for those poor skills when they live in a county or SMSA with a larger Hispanic 
population (McManus, 1990), might reflect network effects, although it could also reflect higher 
productivity from a greater ability to work with Spanish speakers in the enclave.
39  Munshi (2003) 
presents a more-refined analysis of Mexican immigrants, tying labor market outcomes to a larger local 
population of immigrants from the same origin community.  Patel and Vella (2007) find that new 
immigrants work disproportionately in occupations held by previous immigrants from the same country.  
And our previous work documents establishment-level segregation by English language skills, and 
segregation of Spanish-speaking workers from non-Spanish speaking workers among poor English 
speakers (Hellerstein and Neumark, 2008).  Finally, perhaps the most direct evidence of these types of 
networks for immigrants comes from the work of Massey et al. (1987), who document the importance of 
                                                 
39 For a similar type of evidence for Sweden, see Edin et al. (2003).  
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networks linking recent and earlier immigrants from the same communities in Mexico.    
In this section, therefore, we turn to results for Hispanic workers, paying particular attention to 
Hispanic workers who speak English poorly (or not at all), and immigrants.  The results are presented in 
Table 9.  Column (1) presents results for the full sample of Hispanic workers (again with the sample 
restrictions that allow us to construct the network isolation index).  The observed network isolation index 
is 11.22, quite a bit larger than for blacks or whites, and the random network isolation index is 3.08.  
Once we scale the difference between these by the difference between the maximum possible network 
isolation index and the random index, we find that the effective network isolation index for Hispanic 
workers is 22.36 – more than twice as large as what we find for the full samples of blacks or whites.
40    
In column (2) we restrict the sample to Hispanics who self-report speaking English either 
“poorly” or “not at all” – which together we refer to, for simplicity, as the sample of poor English 
speakers.  For this sample, the observed network isolation index is 22.51.  This is very large – it means 
that, on average, for a poor-English speaking Hispanic worker, 22.51 percent of his or her Hispanic co-
workers who also are poor English speakers live in the same census tract!  The simulated random network 
isolation index is much smaller, at 6.56, and the maximum network index is 42.65.  Taken together, these 
numbers yield an effective network isolation index of 44.20, meaning that over 40 percent of the 
maximum possible establishment network isolation by census tract of residence for Hispanics who speak 
English poorly is actually observed in the data.  This is more than four times larger than what we find for 
blacks and whites, and suggests that residence-based labor market networks are extremely important for 
Hispanics who speak English poorly.  In addition, paralleling our results by education level for blacks, the 
fact that the importance of networks goes up when we focus on those with poor language skills implies 
that the overall results for Hispanics are not driven by residential sorting on language skills.
41   
                                                 
40 The comparisons of Hispanics to whites and blacks, and between different groups of Hispanics, are similar for the 
effective network isolation index and the network isolation difference (its numerator), so in the ensuing discussion 
we focus on the effective network isolation index. 
41 We recognize the possibility that these results may be driven partially by reverse causality, where networks that 
are formed on the job serve to help low-skilled Hispanics find housing.  The sample sizes for Hispanics are too small 
for us to conduct the same kind analysis of this issue that we conducted for whites.      
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  By way of contrast, in column (3) of Table 9 we report the results for the sample of Hispanics 
who report speaking English “well” or “very well.”  The effective network isolation index is 18.39, just 
over half as large as that for Hispanics who are poor English speakers.  This contrast is consistent with the 
idea that networks are extremely important in mitigating the high search frictions that exist for workers in 
the United States whose English language skills are poor.  At the same time, the finding that the effective 
network isolation index is much higher for Hispanics who speak good English than for whites suggests 
that the overall Hispanic-white differences are not driven solely by skills.   
  In column (4) we report the results for Hispanic immigrants.  The effective network isolation 
index is 33.91, which is quite a bit higher than for all Hispanics.  In contrast, in column (5) we report the 
results for non-immigrant Hispanics, for whom the effective network isolation index is 16.62, half the size 
of the index for immigrant Hispanics and smaller than for any other Hispanic group in the table.  To the 
extent that the Hispanic workers in column (5) are most integrated into U.S. society and have good 
English language skills, this provides further evidence that our measure of network isolation captures the 
important of residence-based networks that reduce search frictions in the labor market.
42   
VI.5. Results by Race and Ethnicity for Small Establishments 
We noted earlier that our sample selection rules lead to under-representation of small 
establishments, and that this is especially true for blacks and Hispanics.  Moreover, Table 6 makes it clear 
that network isolation is more important for whites who work in small establishments than in large 
establishments.  Therefore, the different sample compositions of establishments could bias our 
comparisons of the importance of networks across racial and ethnic groups in the full samples of each of 
these groups.  In Table 10 we report our measures of (unconditional) network isolation for whites, blacks, 
and Hispanics, where we utilize restricted samples only of workers employed at establishments with 50 or 
fewer workers in total.  Column (1) contains the results for whites, as previously reported in column (2) of 
Table 6.  Column (2) contains the results for blacks, and column (3) the results for Hispanics.  The results, 
                                                 
42 Immigrant status and language skills are strongly related.  A bit under half of the immigrant sample consists of 
poor English speakers, while the non-immigrant sample is nearly entirely good English speakers.  
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which are based on much more homogeneous samples with respect to establishment size than those for 
the full samples, suggest that residence-based networks are much more important for blacks than for 
whites (an effective network isolation index of 39.27 vs. 22.87,
43 and even more so for Hispanics (52.20) 
relative to whites.  Thus, the relative importance of networks for blacks and especially Hispanics 
compared to whites appears greater than is suggested by the analyses of our full samples.   
VII. Conclusions 
We use matched employer-employee data for the United States to measure the importance of 
residence-based labor market networks in the allocation of jobs.  The core of our approach is to look at 
business establishments in a census tract, and to ask whether the workers at each establishment are 
disproportionately clustered in particular residential neighborhoods, relative to what we would expect to 
occur randomly given that most workers employed in a particular census tract reside in a subset of nearby 
census tracts.  Evidence of this kind of disproportionate residential concentration of a business 
establishment’s workforce is consistent with labor market networks that connect individuals residing in 
the same neighborhood to specific business establishments.  Because of recent research highlighting the 
potential importance of labor market networks for less-skilled workers in the labor market, and more 
generally positing that labor market networks operate along the lines of race, ethnicity, and skill, we 
consider separately the importance of these labor market networks for whites, blacks, and Hispanics, and, 
within each group, the relative importance of these networks for workers with different skills. 
Our evidence is complementary to an existing body of research on labor market networks and the 
use of informal labor market contacts that are thought to characterize networks.  What is unique about our 
evidence, however, is that it looks directly at potential network effects for workers employed at the same 
business establishment.  Given that many theories of the importance of labor market networks emphasize 
the gains to employers from using their current employees to refer other employees, it seems particularly 
useful to test whether network connections among workers – in our case based on residential location – 
                                                 
43 Paralleling the results in Table 8 columns (3) and (4), this conclusion for black-white differences is driven by the 
scaling by maximum segregation.  
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actually make it more likely that workers are employed in the same business.   
  We interpret the evidence as indicating that labor market networks play an important role in 
establishment-level employment.  For both whites and blacks we find that the grouping of workers from 
the same neighborhoods in the same business establishments exceeds by a factor of more than two what 
we would expect to occur randomly.  For whites, we find that network isolation is about 10 percent of the 
theoretical maximum amount of grouping that could be found in the data, and many of our analyses 
indicate that residence-based labor market networks are more important for blacks than for whites.  For 
both whites and blacks, these labor market networks appear more important for workers who have low 
levels of education – a high school degree or less – than for more-educated workers.  There is also 
evidence that these networks are more important in small establishments.   
Our results also provide evidence that networks operate to some extent along racial lines, above 
and beyond the racial stratification of networks that comes from residential segregation by race.  In 
particular, the link between residential location and the establishment of employment is stronger for 
blacks when we consider only co-workers of the same race, consistent with more (or more productive) 
labor market information and referrals flowing across co-residents of the same race than of the other race.  
As emphasized in recent theoretical work by Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007), race-based labor 
market networks may prevent the convergence of black and white labor market outcomes – and can even 
exacerbate the differences.  More significantly, this type of racial stratification would imply that policies 
that solely address spatial mismatch, by attempting to move blacks to areas where more whites live and 
where more jobs (per person) are located, may fail to help blacks precisely because network connections 
are severed, and are less likely to be established with white neighbors.
44  
                                                 
44 The evidence from Moving to Opportunity (MTO) is consistent with this conclusion (see, e.g., Turner et al., 
2006).  Qualitative interviews of experimentals and controls in MTO suggest that both groups rely heavily on 
network connections to find jobs, and that experimentals who moved from public housing to lower-poverty 
neighborhoods had less access to neighbors with jobs in the sectors in which they had been previously employed 
(largely retail and health care).  Interestingly, though, the connections through which both experimentals and 
controls reported finding jobs were not “immediate neighbors,” but included associates from school, church, past 
jobs, etc.  We take this to indicate that, for those represented by this sample, residential networks may be better 
captured by broader geographic areas like census tracts than by blocks; on the other hand, it also emphasizes that  
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We also find that residence-based networks are more important for Hispanics than for blacks or  
whites, and among Hispanics, these networks are especially important for immigrants and those with poor 
language skills.  The results for Hispanics give credence to the idea that informal labor market networks 
may be particularly important for those workers who are not as well-integrated into the labor market, and 
for whom employers may have less reliable information.
45   
  As the discussion of the data requirements for this study indicates, it is difficult to obtain 
evidence on labor market networks.  Although the notion of networks has been around for many decades, 
there are only a handful of studies providing evidence that networks affect labor market outcomes, and 
this study is the first to document the importance of labor market networks in determining the 
establishments in which workers work.  Aside from further attempts to construct or obtain data to study 
the kind of network effects we examine in this paper, a number of other important questions remain.  
First, what are the consequences of labor market networks that match workers in a network to specific 
establishments?  Do those who find employment in establishments with others in their networks actually 
have better labor market outcomes (e.g., higher wages or more job security) as a result?  Second, are 
minorities who have network relationships mainly with other minorities disadvantaged relative to those 
that have network relationships with whites?  Third, how does the strength of networks vary across 
residential locations that vary by geography, socioeconomic status, etc.?  The DEED is likely to prove 
useful in trying to address these questions in future research.   
On the other hand, matched employer-employee data sets such as the DEED have some 
limitations in terms of what they can teach us about networks.  First, it is obviously important to consider 
along what other dimensions of social interactions – aside from residence – networks operate to cause 
individuals to work in the same establishment, and what types of networks are most important.  Among 
                                                                                                                                                             
neighbors – however defined – are not the only source of network connections.    
45 As noted previously, the alternative interpretation of our results – that they reflect heterogeneous tastes such that 
people who like similar workplaces also like similar neighborhoods – is not consistent with the patterns of evidence 
that we find whereby residence-based networks are more important for those least integrated into the economy, such 
as those with less education, Hispanics, and especially Hispanic immigrants.  
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the possibilities are schools,
46 religious institutions, and community groups, as well as existing places of 
employment (from which workers may move to other jobs).  Second, the DEED provides little scope for 
understanding the dynamics of how networks are formed and how they operate.  Are all members of the 
network equally important?  What kinds of information get shared within the network?  The data demands 
for answering many of these questions are daunting, but the answers can provide clues regarding how 
important it is for individuals, communities, and other institutions to foster network relationships so as to 
improve economic outcomes, and what types of networks are most effective. 
                                                 
46 Indeed Bayer et al. (2008) show that the type of network effects they study appear to be stronger for those with 
children of similar ages, which could reflect social interactions of families in schools.    
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Figure 1: Census Tracts, Chicago PMSA and Chicago City Limits 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/geo/www.cob.tr2000.html (viewed May 5, 2008).  Note that Chicago city limits are 
highlighted in the left-hand figure, and shown magnified in the right-hand figure.   
Table 1: Individual-Level Means for Preliminary and Final Analysis Samples, White, Black, and Hispanic 
Workers 
  2000 SEDF, 
workers 


















  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)










Female  .46  .50 .50 .63  .46
Married  .58  .61 .62 .42  .57
White  .81  .86 1.0 -  -
Black  .09  .06 - 1.0  -
Hispanic  .09  .07 - -  1.0
Full-time  .78  .82 .83 .84  .83










High school diploma  .31  .29 .26 .28  .25
Some college  .33  .36 .36 .41  .28
BA  .15  .17 .22 .14  .07
Advanced degree  .06  .07 .09 .05  .03
Speaks English well  .97  .92 1.00 .99  .80
Immigrant  .08  .06 .03 .09  .49








































          
Industry:       
Mining  .006  .004 .003 .001  .002
Construction  .081  .048 .041 .007  .040
Manufacturing  .207  .257 .266 .242  .353
Transportation  .075  .052 .053 .074  .052
Wholesale  .047  .052 .054 .025  .050
Retail  .210  .212 .195 .146  .212
FIRE  .070  .068 .072 .079  .043
Services  .304  .306 .316 .425  .249
N  13,456,402 3,924,714 1,675,412 97,967  110,235
Notes: In addition to restricting by race and ethnicity, the three additional restrictions imposed in going 
from column (2) to columns (3) through (5) are: the individual must live and work in same MSA/PMSA; 
there must be at least two workers matched to establishment; and there must be at least one other 
establishment with two matched workers in the census tract.    




2000 DEED, final 
analysis sample 
for whites 
2000 DEED, final 
analysis sample 
for blacks 
2000 DEED, final 
analysis sample 
for Hispanics 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)










15  35 154 84 
Establishment size:       
1-25  .65  .39 .11 .18
26-50  .15  .20 .11 .16
51-100  .10  .17 .14 .20
101+  .10  .22 .62 .45
Industry:       
Mining  .004  .003 .002 .003
Construction  .078  .070 .013 .053
Manufacturing  .133  .186 .226 .310
Transportation  .050  .052 .077 .051
Wholesale  .067  .074 .039 .060
Retail  .284  .265 .231 .266
FIRE  .081  .077 .082 .049
Services  .303  .272 .331 .209
In MSA/PMSA  .792  1.0 1.0 1.0
Census region:       
North East  .053  .048 .013 .015
Mid Atlantic  .135  .148 .122 .084
East North Central  .199  .232 .204 .088
West North Central  .092  .089 .039 .010
South Atlantic  .166  .157 .332 .052
East South Central  .050  .043 .081 .002
West South Central  .102  .090 .136 .218
Mountain  .061  .057 .012 .084
Pacific  .142  .135 .061 .448




















.16  .14 .05 .07
Multi-unit 
establishment 
.40  .51 .80 .61
N  1,254,718 329,943 21,872 30,343
Notes: See notes to Table 1.  The approximate median is an average of the median and some 
observations to either side of the median, to preserve confidentiality.    


































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O  7.87 7.87 7.87 7.87 7.87 10.95
 
5.94
Simulated random network isolation index, 
NI
R  
2.97      4.81
 
2.28
Network isolation difference, NI
O − NI
R  4.90      6.15 3.66
Maximum possible network isolation index, 
NI
M 
52.06 52.06 52.06 52.06 52.06 52.01
 
43.74
Effective network isolation index,  
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI
 M − NI
 R)]·100 
9.99      1 3 . 0 2 8.82
*** 
Simulated conditional network isolation 
index, NI
C  
  3.02 3.13 3.25 3.49   
NI
O − NI
C    4.84 4.74 4.61 4.38   
Conditional effective network isolation index,  
[(NI
 O − NI
 C)/(NI






***   
          
N  1,675,412 1,675,412 1,675,412 1,675,412 1,675,412 441,133 1,014,931 
# place of work tracts  26,470 26,470 26,470 26,470 26,470 16,073 20,378
# residential tracts  46,764 46,764 46,764 46,764 46,764 40,754 45,311
Mean establishments/tract  129.6 129.6 129.6 129.6 129.6 47.1 98.0
Mean matched workers/establishment  38.4 38.4 38.4 38.4 38.4 10.8 41.0
Mean number of workers in tract of 
employment from same tract of residence 
9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 6.2 5.7
Notes: The calculation is described in the text.  NI
O is the average fraction of a worker’s co-workers (i.e., excluding the worker) who reside in the same census tract as the 
worker, averaged across all workers in the sample.  NI
R is the average fraction that is simulated to occur randomly.  NI
M is the simulated average maximum fraction.  “Effective 
network isolation” therefore measures the fraction of the maximum that is actually observed.  In column (2) the categories are high school degree or less and more than high 
school.  In column (3) they are less than high school degree, high school degree, some college, and bachelor’s degree or higher. In column (4) the occupation categories are 
managerial and professional specialty; technical, sales, and administrative support; service; farming, forestry, and fishery; precision production, craft, and repair; and operators, 
fabricators, and laborers. In column (5), the housing price quartiles are constructed for the MSA. The sample sizes in columns (6)-(7) add up to less than the sample size in 
column (1) because the sample exclusion restrictions are imposed for each education size category.  All effective measures of network isolation are statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 1-percent level. The table also reports results for statistical significance of the difference between the following pairs of estimates: (a) conditional on 
two education categories (col. 2) vs. all whites (col. 1); (b) conditional on four education categories (col. 3) vs. all whites (col. 1); (c) conditional on 1-digit occupation (col. 4) 
vs. all whites (col. 1); (d) conditional on housing value (col. 5) vs. all whites (col. 1); and (e) more than a high school degree (col. 7) vs. less than a high school degree (col. 6).  
In each case, the differences are statistically significant at the 1-percent level (denoted by 
***).  






born 1996 or after 
Working in newer 
establishments and did 
not move 1995-2000 
  (1) (2) (3)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O  7.87 8.47 10.25
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R  2.97 3.01 3.64
Network isolation difference, NI
O − NI
R  4.90 5.46 6.61
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI
M 52.06 38.88 32.53
Effective network isolation index,  
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI
 M − NI
 R)]·100 
9.99 15.21 22.87 
      
N  1,675,412 216,920 68,821
# place of work tracts  26,470 8,886 4,074
# residential tracts  46,764 39,209 26,622
Mean establishments/tract  129.6 38.8 17.7
Mean matched workers/establishment  38.4 20.2 14.3
Mean number of workers in tract of employment 
from same tract of residence 
9.4 2.9 2.0
Notes: See notes to Table 3. All effective network isolation measures are statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 1-percent level.  







Conditional on two 
education categories and 
eight industry categories
  (1) (2) (3)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O 7.87 7.87 7.87
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R  2.97   
Network isolation difference, NI
O − NI
R 4.90   
Simulated conditional network isolation index, NI
C  4.02 4.12
NI
O − NI
C    3.85 3.75
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI
M 52.06 52.06 52.06
Effective network isolation index, 
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI
 M − NI
 R)]·100
9.99   
Conditional effective network isolation index, 
[(NI
 O − NI
 C)/(NI





Share of effective isolation index unexplained after 
conditioning or additional conditioning
  78.5 76.5
See notes to Table 3.  The industries are mining; construction; manufacturing; transportation and warehousing; 
wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services.  The education categories are high school 
degree or less and more than high school.  All effective network isolation measures are statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 1-percent level. The table also reports results for statistical significance of the difference 
between the following pairs of estimates: (a) conditional on eight industry categories (col. 2) vs. unconditional results 
for all whites (col. 1); and (b) conditional on two education categories and eight industry categories (col. 3) vs. 
unconditional results for all whites (col. 1). In each case, the differences are statistically significant at the 1-percent level 
(denoted by 
***).  
Table 6: Network Isolation for Whites, by Establishment Size  
   Establishment size 
  All  ≤ 50 51-100 101-250  > 250
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O  7.87 15.76 6.08 4.59  2.82
Simulated random network isolation 
index, NI
R  
2.97 4.55 2.86 2.58  2.03
Network isolation difference, NI
O − NI
R  4.90 11.21 3.22 2.01  0.79
Maximum possible network isolation 
index, NI
M 
52.06 53.56 36.93 32.50  19.95
Effective network isolation index,  
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI
 M − NI
 R)]·100 
9.99 22.87 9.45 6.70 4.41 
         
N  1,675,412 527,430 208,507 262,437  448,155
# place of work tracts  26,470 22,162 9,055 4,448  3,790
# residential tracts  46,764 43,700 39,425 40,663  42,603
Mean establishments/tract  129.6 66.0 29.2 26.8  19.2
Mean matched workers/establishment  38.4 3.3 6.1 11.0  96.2
Mean number of workers in tract of 
employment from same tract of residence
9.4 3.9 2.5 3.2  6.6
Notes: See notes to Table 3.  The sample sizes in columns (2)-(5) add up to less than the sample size in column 
(1) because the sample exclusion restrictions are imposed for each establishment size category.  All effective 
network isolation measures are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
 
  










  (1) (2) (3)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O 5.29 8.22 3.41
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R  2.58 4.11 1.74
Network isolation difference, NI
O − NI
R 2.71 4.11 1.67
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI
M 30.71 31.48 24.67
Effective network isolation index,  
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI






      
N  97,967 27,001 47,281
# place of work tracts  4,490 1,923 2,278
# residential tracts  21,623 10,685 16,107
Mean establishments/tract  22.2 10.2 17.4
Mean matched workers/establishment 18.6 8.2 15.8
Mean number of workers in tract of employment 
from same tract of residence 
2.6 2.2 1.9
Notes: See notes to Table 3. All effective network isolation measures are statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 1-percent level. The table also reports results for statistical significance of 
the difference between pairs of estimates. First, there is test of differences across estimates within 
this table, in particular blacks with a high school degree or less (col. 2) vs. blacks with more than a 
high school degree (col. 3).  The difference is statistically significant at the 1-percent level (denoted 
by 
***).  Second, there are tests of differences across estimates in this table and other tables, in 
particular: (1) all blacks (col. 1) vs. all whites (Table 3, col. 1); (2) blacks with a high school degree 
or less (col. 2) vs. whites with a high school degree or less (Table 3, col. 6); and (3) blacks with 
more than a high school degree (col. 3) vs. whites with more than a high school degree (Table 3, col. 
7). In each case, the differences are statistically significant at the 1-percent level (denoted by 
+++).   
Table 8: Network Isolation for Blacks and Whites, for Consistent Samples of Establishments, and Ignoring Race   
     Establishments located in 
tracts in both black and 
white samples
 
Network isolation based 
on blacks and whites 
  All whites All blacks Whites Blacks All blacks
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O 7.87 5.29 5.68  5.25 3.99
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R  2.97 2.58 1.48  2.54 2.00
Network isolation difference, NI
O − NI
R 4.90 2.71 4.20  2.72 2.00
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI
M 52.06 30.71 58.37  31.43 35.83
Effective network isolation index,  
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI
 M − NI
 R)]·100 
9.99 9.63 7.38  9.41
*** 5.90
***
          
N  1,675,412 97,967 845,290 94,210 140,083
# place of work tracts  26,470 4,490 4,122  4,122 9,094
# residential tracts  46,764 21,623 42,533 21,459 26,768
Mean establishments/tract  129.6 22.2 229.7  23.0 39.7
Mean matched workers/establishment 38.4 18.6 46.6  17.7 40.3
Mean number of workers in tract of employment 
from same tract of residence 
9.4 2.6 11.4  2.6 4.5
Notes: See notes to Table 3. All effective network isolation measures are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1-percent 
level. The table also reports results for statistical significance of the difference between the following pairs of estimates: (a) whites 
working in establishments located in tracts in both the black and white samples (col. 3) vs. blacks working in establishments located in 
tracts in the black and white samples (col. 4); and (b) blacks when network isolation is based on blacks and whites (col. 5) vs. all blacks 
(col. 1). In each case, the differences are statistically significant at the 1-percent level (denoted by 
***). 
















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O 11.22 22.51 8.30 16.68 7.20
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R  3.08 6.56 2.47 4.46 2.50
Network isolation difference, NI
O − NI
R 8.14 15.95 5.83 12.22 4.70
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI
M 39.48 42.65 34.17 40.50 30.78
Effective network isolation index, 
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI




*** 33.91  16.62
*** 
          
N  110,235 12,451 80,661 42,712 43,763
# place of work tracts  5,059 900 4,090 2,508 2,563
# residential tracts  20,716 4,576 19,027 11,321 14,063
Mean establishments/tract  59.7 23.3 46.3 43.2 28.8
Mean matched workers/establishment 9.1 4.8 9.4 5.7 9.7
Mean number of workers in tract of employment 
from same tract of residence
2.7 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.0
Notes: See notes to Table 3. All effective network isolation measures are statistically significantly different from zero at the 
1-percent level. The table also reports results for statistical significance of the difference between pairs of estimates.  First, 
there is test of differences across estimates within this table, in particular: Hispanics with good English skills (col. 3) vs. 
Hispanics with poor English skills (col. 2); and (3) non-immigrant Hispanics (col. 5) vs. Immigrant Hispanics (col. 4). In 
each case, the difference is statistically significant at the 1-percent level (denoted by 
***). Second, there are tests of 
differences across estimates in this table and other tables, in particular: all Hispanics (col. 1) vs. all whites (Table 3, col. 1); 
and all Hispanics (col. 1) vs. all blacks (Table 7, col. 1). In each case, the differences are statistically significant at the one 
percent level (denoted by 
+++ in the first case, and 
§§§ in the second).  
  
Table 10: Network Isolation for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics Working in Small Establishments (50 employees or less) 
  Whites Blacks Hispanics 
  (1)  (2) (3)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O 15.76  12.76 22.79
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R  4.55  4.34 5.72
Network isolation difference, NI
O − NI
R 11.21  8.42 17.07
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI
M 53.56  25.77 38.41
Effective network isolation index, 
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI





      
N  527,430  8,706 21,952
# place of work tracts  22,162  1,097 2,093
# residential tracts  43,700  5,308 8,019
Mean establishments/tract  66.0  7.4 23.0
Mean matched workers/establishment 3.3  2.7 2.7
Mean number of workers in tract of employment from same tract 
of residence 
3.9  1.4 1.8
Notes: See notes to Table 3. All effective network isolation measures are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1-
percent level. The table also reports results for statistical significance of the difference between the following pairs of 
estimates: (a) blacks working in small establishments (col. 2) vs. whites working in small establishments (col. 1); and (b) 
Hispanics working in small establishments (col. 3) vs. whites working in small establishments (col. 1). In each case, the 
differences are statistically significant at the one percent level (denoted by 
***).  
 
  
 
 
 
  